This paper intends to clarify the applicability of the so-called “Radbruchsche Formel” for the judicial legislation (sec. I)

  Radbruch regarded the overcome of the past by law as possible, because to him the retroactive effect of ex post facto law was the essence of “judge made law” itself. According to such interpretation even under the NS-regime the content of “übergesetzliches Recht” (meta-legal law) remained valid as “ethische Auffassung des Volkes” (ethical idea of people) and therefore “unjust” acts have been punishable from the time of performance. From post-WWII up to nowadays, from the NS-lawsuits up to the recent “Mauerschützen”-lawsuits the “Formel” has served as reliable pattern. However, that common interpretation demands further explication, because national socialists interpretated “gesundes Volksempfinden” (sound susceptibility of people) as “übergesetzliches Recht” (sec. II and III).

  Hereupon it is necessary to point out Radburch's conception of “Natur der Sache” (the nature of things) to achieve an improved understanding of his “Formel”. This shows the historicity of law and the relatively free developement of respective systems of law in a world historic process. Hence the national socialist's idea of law and right can neither be seen as “übergesetzliches Recht” nor as “Naturrecht” (natural law) which has been made positive. In conclusion the “Formel” should be applied for the overcome of the past only if the validity of certain laws is measured by his definition of “Natur der Sache” (sec. IV and V).

  Clinamen, which refers to the declination of atoms, emerges twice in the marginal spheres of “Marxist science” : it appears in the Dissertation of Marx (1841), and in Althusser's writings in 1980s, which advocate aleatory materialism.

  Firstly, I stress the “problematic,” uncertain character of these spheres of Clinamen in the eyes of the concept. In fact, the conceptual unity of the global sciences (Hegelian science for the Dissertation, Marxist theory for the aleatory materialism) breaks up in the respective contexts. This conjuncture drives both authors to change their discursive element. Then, they invoke the metaphorical signification of Clinamen so as to displace the pretended univocality of the scientific concept.

  Secondly, I examine the temporal dimension of Clinamen. In effect, Hegelian determination of the dialectical concept as “Macht der Zeit” is understood as partially the case of Clinamen : the latter, like the former, is a principle of becoming. However, the “problematic,” metaphorical character of Clinamen restricts the work of the negative, which is essential to the dialectical concept. Epicurean atoms tarry in the fixed positivity of representation, which is “overtaken” by Hegel.

  I conclude with a political reflection on this remarkable “backwardness” of Clinamen.

  One of Th.W.Adorno's works, “The philosophy of the contemporary music,” intended to explore the process in which the atonal music, which had appeared to realize freedom of the composition, became a deductive system of the twelve-ton technic (by Schönberg). It also attempted to protect freedom (expressive-dynamic listen type) against the repressing principle in the music (rhythm-space listen type in the neo-sachlichkeit). As he suggested, music and styles of listening to music reflect objectively the sociophilosophical problems such as regression of the “consistent understanding” through the development of technology. I don't think, however, that Adorno sufficiently solved the antinomy between structural consistency of a spirit and an intentionless stratum of musical materials. For this reason I consider it necessary to reconstruct his observation from a point of view that can graps and categorize totally the change of history, people's social life styles, and types of affective responses, including habits and customs.

  “Thought” means “hope” for the future as well as “reflection” on the past. In this sense, “thought” is not short but long-term one.

  A Japanese scholar refused to take office as the Minister for Agriculture and Forestry in 1946. He was the first scholar that had adopted modern economics to Japanese agriculture. His name is Seiichi Tobata.

  In my view, “Tobata's refusal” had so close a relation to his economic “thought.” This paper intends to discuss that point, to which so far very few seem to have paid serious attention, as follows. In the first section, I raise the question of why Tobata refused to take office as the Minister. In the second section, I traced the process of the affair “Tobata's refusal.” In the third and fourth section, I mainly analyzed Tobata's own papers written in 1946. In the last section, I showed my opinion about the relation between “Tobata's refusal” and his economic “thought.”

  Finally, my thanks to Sasakawa Scientific Research Grant from The Japan Science Society. They gave the opportunity to work on my study and write this paper.