This paper examines the philosophy of Christian Garve, Enlightenment German philosopher, with a special reference to his essay “On mode”. His argument was featured in two ways : first, he, unlike Kant, fully investigated into the process of civilization and its implications ; and second, he argued from an empiricist point of view, which made his argument realistic. He showed what man's morals should be, apart from pointing out how individuals and society actually were.

  Garve began the essay by examining how the mode of the time was formed. According to him, each man, aiming at following the mode, associated routinely with each other. Man wanted to conform to others in terms of ‘imitation’, aspiring, at the same time, to have superiority over others. He also stated that the mode was socially-dependent, for the mode of a certain time was crucially affected by the condition of industry at that time. In so doing, the ‘Bürgerclassen’ (which meant those people excluding the upper class and the lowest poor) played a vital role in setting the mode of the time ; they achieved industrial diversification, which subsequently diversified the model of mode.

  He wrote that the diffusion of mode not only encouraged the social development, but also caused poverty. Luxury of ‘Bürgerclassen’, with their diligence, led the development of industry, and therefore, of civilization. The ‘Bürgerclassen’ was, however, composed largely of the labors, particularly unskilled labors. In spite of not being rich, they hoped to follow the mode, ironically in order to make themselves differed from others. Consequently, they inevitably wasted money and efforts. He found the question here:a question of how man'smoral, particularly that of the industrious man, should be. As for this question, he offered two possible solutions. First, he wrote that, as far as the upper class was concerned, civilization through the diffusion of the mode could refine their sense of beauty, and subsequently, their favourable sense would be the criterion of morals. Second, as far as the ‘Bürgerclassen’ was concerned, he claimed that it was the most important that they acquired the sense of temperance.

  Garve intended his philosophy to be useful for the ordinary people. He believed that philosophy should be ‘popular’ in that it was plain for the people to understand, and that it was the ordinary people that had to be initially enlightened. While Kant critically saw the people as those remaining in the state of infant, Garve had more favourable view on their condition.

  The objective of this article is to make clear why and how the catchword “War and Revolution” was created from the dialogue in 1914 and 1915 between two Italian journals, La Voce and Lacerba, founded by Giovanni Papini (1881-1956) and Giuseppe Prezzolini (1882-1982) respectively, and describes how the catchword consolidated the mob as a political power against the Italian parliamentary regime, which was incited to participate in the Great War.

  The article argues the following theses. First, the philosopher of Naples, Benedetto Croce (1866-1952), sharing the noble spirit of Francesco De Sanctis (1817-1883), one of the politicians in the Risorgimento, started cultural activities aimed at the “philosophical awakening” in Italy. This campaign was hailed by two members of the younger generation of Florence, Papini and Prezzolini, with whom Croce collaborated to criticize positivism. Croce inspired Prezzolini to found the journal La Voce in 1908, which gathered various writers and worked for political and cultural innovation in Italy. Second, while Prezzolini understood the rational position of Croce and continued to cooperate with him, Papini, with huge philosophical ambition, opposed not only positivism but also Croce as a new cultural authority, and founded the irrational journal Lacerba. Third, even though the two journals differed, they had the same basis of promoting political and cultural innovation in Italy. However, the parliamentary system could not satisfy the demands of mass society. Seeing the Settimana rossa revolt against the government on the 7^th June 1914, Papini and Prezzolini could not hope for the innovation of the political system and came to consider the possibility of revolution. When the Great War broke out in July 1914, they did not want innovation any more, and began the dialogue between the two journals in order to discuss revolution in Italy. Creating the catchword “War and Revolution”, they had a great deal of influence on public opinion.

  This catchword, interpreted in various ways, was accepted by every group that wanted Italy to participate in the War. Prezzolini, hoping for direct leadership in the revolution, abandoned his position as chief editor of La Voce, and decided to help the activities of mobs in collaboration with Mussolini. In the squares of Rome, the logic did not work. The mobs, which contained nationalists, revolutionary socialists, and futurists, were united against the common enemy and had recourse to violence, destroying the parliament and assailing representatives. Under such a menace, on 20^th May 1914, the Italian parliament passed a bill making the War acceptable.

  Leo Strauss and Hannah Arendt are famous for their return to the ancient Greek thought and praxis, but their return is very different in terms of content. This paper examines the difference and the conflict of their political philosophy, and investigates the relationship of “politics” and “philosophy” in their thoughts.

  Firstly, the difference and the conflict is not that Strauss's main concern is the “philosophy” of ancient Greek, whereas Arendt sides with “politics” opposed to “philosophy”. From their critique of Heidegger's political commitment to Nazi Germany, their main question is not whether we should choose “politics” or “philosophy”, but what kind of “political-philosophy” is needed and available in their age. So, by clarifying what they say “politics” and “philosophy” in their texts, I will compare the meaning of the Strauss's “political-philosophy” with the Arendt's one.

  Secondly, in such contrast, I will focus on the key concept “the whole” in Strauss's thought, “the world” in Arendt's texts. In so doing, it will be clear that the difference and the conflict of their thoughts is between politics of “the whole” and that of “the world”. Politics of “the whole” and that of “the world” indicate the different political problems, the different relationship of “politics” and “philosophy”.

  This article attempts to explore Jacques Ellul's view of violence and shed some light on its political implications. In Contre les violents, Ellul examined Christian involvement in the violent world of politics. In this article, I try to explicate the crux of his argument and evaluate its validity in contrast with political ethics of Machiavelli (interpreted by I. Berlin) and Weber. The main purpose of this contrast is to prove that Ellul's standpoint which he calls “Christian realism” is in diametrical opposition to Machiavellian/Weberian political ethics while sharing its basic political sensitivity.

  I begin by examining Ellul's sociological diagnosis of violence. Ellul views violence as a sociologically autonomous dynamics. In parallel with Weber, Ellul depicts politics as being essentially based on the dynamism of violence. It is this viewpoint that makes him contend that Christian must be realistic through and through in the Weberian sense and that they must have a keen awareness of the tension between the sphere of politics and the sphere of Christian faith.

  I then tum to consideration of some implications of his Christian realism. Introducing Berlin's interpretative framework, I argue that Ellul is in accord with Machiavelli in that he puts much emphasis on the unbending distinction between those two spheres and the fundamental irreconcilability that arises therein. By reversing Machiavelli's republican perspective and Weber's sober Realpolitik, one can clearly see that Ellul is looking at the reverse side of the medal and that his stance is that of an “Unarmed Prophet”.

  In the next section, I will go on to examine some political implications of the prescription Ellul writes out for Christian. Ellul posits a kind of nonviolence which he calls “violence of love” as the only position concordant with Christian vocation. It is a mode of being which is, in his understanding, as agonistic as political action. Ellul's stance leads to a certain formulation of “anti-politics”, but, as I shall contend, this “anti-politics” is to be best understood as a peculiar form of inner-worldly agonism.

  I conclude with brief reflection on Ellulian agonism. I suggest that his agonism might be interpreted as a form of citizenship, if not “political” in the ordinary sense of the word : it is rather a form of citizenship as “foreign object”, an alienated and abstentionist variant.

  In this study, I examine Axel Honneth's theory of reification developed in his recent book Verdinglichung (Suhrkamp, 2005). The main aim of this book is the reformulation of Lukács' theory of reification from a recognition-theoretical perspective. I divide my argument into four points, in order to appreciate this recognition-theoretical reformulation:(1) I summarize Honneth's argument; (2) I compare it with Habermas' argument over the problem of reification, i. e., the “colonization thesis” ; (3) I ascertain its relationship with the previous discussions, especially Marx's; and (4) I criticize Honneth's comprehension of depersonalization (Entpersönlichung) /thingification (Versachlichung).

  1. I follow the logical procedure through which Honneth leads to a new definition of reification, namely, “Forgetfulness of Recognition”. By referring to Lukacs' concept of “empathetic engagement (Anteilnahme)”, Heidegger's concept of “care (Sorge)”, and Dewey's concept of “qualitative experience”, Honneth presents a recognition-theoretical concept of “an antecedent act of recognition (vorgängige Anerkennung)”. According to Honneth, reification is brought about when we forget this antecedent act of recognition. In this sense, we can understand it as a positive criterion for a critique of reification.

  2. I think that Honneth's theory of reification follows in the footsteps of Habermas' one as he principally understands reification as pathology or distortion in communication. However, his argument aims to complement Habermas' colonization thesis with the recognition-theoretical, existence-philosophical interpretation on the pathology in communication. However, I believe that Honneth's argument can, on the other hand, be complemented with Habermas' system-theoretical interpretation of it.

  3. If we compare Honneth's argument with Marx's, we find that it is closer to the alienation theory developed in Economic and philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 than to the theory of reification developed in Capital. That Honneth does not treat any objective aspect of the problem of reification, which Marx treated in the analysis of commodities, makes us suspect that he intends to reduce the problem of reification to that of alienation.

  4. I believe that Honneths comprehension of depersonalization/thingification is one of the causes for his inclination toward the alienation theory. By identifying depersonalization/thingification with “legal recognition”, he differentiates it from reification, and thereby excludes the former from the framework of the recognition-theoretical reformulation of the theory of reification. This means that he abandons the theoretical tradition that stems from M. Weber or G. Simmel, and the one that Habermas expanded in The Theory of Communicative Action. In this respect, I criticize Honneth's comprehension of depersonalization/thingification.